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**AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF PRINCIPLES OF
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
With An Emphasis On Their Application
In China**

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
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AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY—WITH AN EMPHASIS ON THEIR APPLICATION IN CHINA

Being a state of extensive territory situated between two main oceans, rich in raw material and mineral resources, fertile in soil, advanced in industry and commerce, strong in naval, aerial and military forces, the voice and attitude of the United States carries a great weight in international relations. Consequently the pendulum of world politics is closely related to American foreign policy. Geography has made the United States a Pacific Power, which in turn makes it clear that this Great American Republic has a definite interest in the Pacific.¹ From both academic and practical point of view to have an analytical study of the fundamental principles, purposes, motivations, and execution of American diplomacy will be of interest. If possible, in this light, an explanation is hoped to be found for the application of the principles of American diplomacy in China.

TWO TERMS: "DIPLOMACY" AND "AMERICAN"

The term "diplomacy" may be interpreted in different ways by various writers but it is employed throughout this paper to mean the practice or expression of negotiations between sovereign states through the proper channels of international conduct. In other words, it is the total product or net policy of the relations of one state toward another through the expression of the tact or skill of its accredited agents in accordance with legal procedure and international customs or traditions

¹ Raymond L. Buell, "America's Policies in the Pacific" in *The New York Times*, 22 January 1933, sec. 8, p. 3.

or usages.² The prime aim of the diplomacy of any State is to promote the security, unity and prosperity of its people.

The term "American" is employed throughout this study in the narrow and colloquial sense, pertaining to the United States of America.

"EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY:" A COMPARISON

There has been, and still is, a belief in Europe and in Asia that American diplomacy is not to be compared with European diplomacy, on the ground that the diplomats of America are decidedly inferior to those of Europe. Yet from the earliest days of the United States, she has not been without diplomats of admitted distinction. Edwin A. Grosvenor tells the following story of Benjamin Franklin, "one of the ablest diplomats of the 18th century" and "the first exponent of American diplomacy." It is found in a description of a banquet at which the British Ambassador, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Franklin, the American envoy, were present. Each was to offer a toast and then speak in line with the sentiment he had proposed. With national pride, the British Ambassador gave: "Great Britain, the Sun, whose rays encircle and vivify the earth." The French Minister, swelling with a sentiment as loyal, gave: "France, the Moon, whose beneficent beams reach the nations even in darkness and make their dreariness beautiful." Then the simple American diplomat proposed: "George Washington, the Joshua, who commanded the Sun and the Moon to stand still, and they both obeyed him."³

² The term "Diplomacy" seems to remain in a primitive state and needs further development. George Young in his *Diplomacy, Old and New*. (Lond., 1931), p. 28, says: "Diplomacy and diplomatic service remain in bondage and in Egyptian darkness." Charles Hayward, in his *What is Diplomacy?* (Lond., 1916), pp. 7, 17, maintains that diplomacy still survives in the most disgracefully primitive conditions of the darkest ages of ignorance. Other definitions of this term may be found in *Academie Diplomatique Internationale, Dictionnaire Diplomatique* 2v. (Paris, 1934); David P. Heatly, *Diplomacy and the Study of International Relations*. (Lond., 1919); Ernest M. Satow, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*. 3rd ed. (Lond., 1932).

³ Edwin A. Grosvenor, *American Diplomacy*, in *American Historical Association, Annual Report* (Washington, 1898), 291-292.

The recognition of American independence by the Netherlands was a memorable achievement of American diplomacy and was largely due to the efforts of John Adams. As Professor Channing says: "Seldom in the history of diplomacy have negotiations, begun in doubtful circumstances, been crowned with greater success." Even the American historian admits that "It is impossible not to be struck with the skill and hardihood that marked the American negotiation."⁴ When judging the comparative merits of the diplomacy of different nations, it is necessary to take into account the various elements which enter into the formulation and execution of national policies regarding international affairs. It is an undeniable fact that the foreign policy of a state depends very much on the domestic policies of that state, for foreign policy is the result of the internal development of a given society, a given state, acting under definite historical conditions and adopting toward another state or states the line of conduct dictated by its own best interests. Consequently, it should be noted that the distinctive structure of American Government exercises a definite influence upon the character of the foreign policy of the United States. Moreover, American traditions, psychology, and the economic and cultural bases of its society are not similar to those of any other nation or country in Europe or in Asia. George W. Wickersham asserts that—

... the foreign policy of any nation is the resultant of varied forces. Economic conditions, commercial rivalries, dynastic ambitions and special issues arising from time to time determine a nation's attitude toward other states.⁵

John W. Davis, in discussing the fundamental factors of American diplomacy, maintains substantially the same idea as Wickersham, but gives to it a slightly different expression:

History, tradition, political structure, geographical location,

⁴ *Ibid.*, 293-294.

⁵ George W. Wickersham, "Political Factors in American Diplomacy" in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. X No. 1 (October, 1931), 1.

commercial interests, all these, to say nothing of the ambitions of statesmen and the exigencies of the moment go to the making of a foreign policy.⁶

The essential difference between European and American diplomacy may be very briefly stated as follows: European diplomacy tends to be secret, involved, tortuous, and conservative; American diplomacy seems to be open, simple, direct, and progressive. The difference arises from a variety of causes, prominent among them being the wide control over foreign relations exercised by the Senate, the highly-protected geographical situation of the United States, the abundance of basic natural resources, the absence of far-flung colonial possessions and of hostile neighboring States, and unparalleled freedom of action in international affairs resulting from an advantageous physical situation.

It would seem, then, that American diplomacy in China should logically partake of the character of that diplomacy elsewhere, that it should be based upon America's traditional beliefs, upon her domestic policy, her geographical, economic and political situation, and upon other factors underlying the structure of her Government. It is to be expected, therefore, that American diplomacy toward China should be different from that of the old European countries toward the Middle Kingdom. Dr. Taraknath Das, lecturer on Far Eastern questions at the Catholic University of America, says that "American policy toward Asia has been entirely different from that of European nations."⁷

The United States, in its comparatively brief existence as a nation, has exercised a great influence in molding international law and has done much to raise the standard of diplomatic practice. Thus John Bassett Moore, in the concluding chapter of his *American Diplomacy*, among other things says:

⁶ Davis, "The Permanent Bases of American Foreign Policy," in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. X, No. 1 (October, 1931), 1.

⁷ Taraknath Das, *Foreign Policy in the Far East*. (N.Y., 1936), 243.

American diplomacy was also employed in the advancement of the principle of legality. American statesmen sought to regulate the relations of nations by law, not only as a measure for the protection of the weak against the aggressions of the strong, but also as the only means of assuring the peace of the world.⁸

The United States has favored the theory that international law should be a guiding principle of international conduct, and that it should also be a safeguard of world peace. Secretary Hull, the chief delegate to the Buenos Aires Conference (1936), particularly and emphatically said:

International law has been in large measure flouted. It should be reestablished, revitalized and strengthened by general demand. International law protects the peace and security of nations, and so safeguards them against maintaining great armaments and wasting their substance in continual readiness for war . . . Armies and navies are no permanent substitute. Abandonment of the rule of law would not only leave small or unarmed states at the mercy of the reckless and powerful, but would hopelessly undermine all international order.⁹

UNITED STATES AND ARMED NEUTRALITY

From the beginning of its existence, the United States favored free commerce and neutral rights in time of war. As early as 1780 when England was at war with the United States, France and the Netherlands, Benjamin Franklin enthusiastically supported the principle of "Free ships make free goods," advanced by the states comprising the "Armed Neutrality."¹⁰

⁸ John Bassett Moore, *The Principles of American Diplomacy*. (Washington, Lond., 1918), 423-424.

⁹ U. S. Department of State. *Press Releases*, Vol. 15, (December 5, 1936), 440.

¹⁰ For a full account of the Armed Neutrality, see: George Bemis, *American Neutrality: Its Honorable Past, Its Expedient Future* (Boston, 1866); Samuel F. Bemis, *The United States and the Abortive Armed Neutrality of 1784*. (N.Y., 1916); Carl Bergbom, *Die Bewaffnete Neutralität 1780-1785*. (Dorpat, 1883); William S. Carpenter, "The United States and the League of Neutrals of 1780" in *American Journal of International Law*,

On June 3, 1780, he wrote to Morris:

. . . Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland are raising a strong naval force to establish the free navigation for neutral ships and of all their cargoes, though belonging to enemies, except contraband—that is, military stores, France and Spain have approved of it, and it is likely to become henceforth the law of nations that *free ships make free goods*. England does not like this confederacy. I wish they would extend it still further, and ordain that unarmed trading ships, as well as fishermen and tanners, should be respected as working for the common benefit of mankind, and never to be interrupted in their operations even by national enemies; but let those only fight with one another whose trade it is, and who are armed and paid for the purpose.¹¹

On October 5, 1780, the Congress of the United States passed the following resolution:

. . . Her Imperial Majesty of all the Russias, attentive to the freedom of commerce and the rights of the nations, in her declaration to the belligerent and neutral powers, having proposed regulations founded upon principles of justice, equity, and moderation . . . Congress, willing to testify their regard to the rights of commerce and their respect for the sovereign who hath proposed and the powers that have approved the said regulations.

Resolved, That the Board of Admiralty prepare and report instructions for the commanders of armed vessels commanded by the United States conformable to the principles contained in the declaration of the Empress of all the Russias on the right of neutral vessels.

Vol. 15, 511-522; Paul Fauchille, *La Diplomatie Francaise et la Ligue des Neutres de 1780*. (1776-1783) (Paris, 1895); Sir Francis T. Piggott and O. N. T. Omond, *Documentary History of the Armed Neutralities, 1780 and 1800*. (Lond., 1919); James Brown Scott, "Historical Introduction" in S. F. Bemis (ed.), *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy*. 10v. (N.Y., 1927). Vol. I; Cortz Johann Buslach Graf von Schiltz, *The Secret History of the Armed Neutrality*. (Lond., 1792); James Brown Scott, *The Armed Neutralities of 1780 and 1800*. (N.Y., 1918); and John N. Tetona, *Considerations sur les Reciproques des Puissances Neutres sur Mer avec les Peincipes du Droit de Guerre en general*. (Copenhagen, 1805).

¹¹ Francis Wharton, *The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States* 6v. (Washington, 1889), III, 761.

That the ministers plenipotentiary from the United States, if invited thereto, be and hereby are respectively empowered to accede to such regulations, conformable to the spirit of the said declaration, as may be agreed upon by the Congress expected to assemble in pursuance of the invitation of her Imperial Majesty.¹²

These resolutions of the Congress of the United States were transmitted by John Adams to the Netherlands with the request that they be forwarded to Denmark, Russia, and Sweden and that the United States be admitted as a party to the confederacy, entitled to its benefits and rights and subjected to its duties.¹³

Without regard to the effectiveness of the Armed Neutrality, it is evident that the spirit of American foreign policy from its very beginning favored the principle that "free ships make free goods." That principle is the basis of the present-day law of neutrality. Applied by the United States throughout the War of 1812, it was recognized by being embodied in the Declaration of Paris of 1856. This declaration consisted of four important rules:

1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished;
2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war;
3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag;
4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.¹⁴

All of these except the first had long been advocated by the United States and even the first had been incorporated in its treaty with Prussia in 1785. Especially the fourth rule of the Paris Declaration, which

¹² Wharton, *op. cit.*, IV, 80-81

¹³ *Ibid.*, IV, 274-275.

¹⁴ Quoted in John Bassett Moore, *Digest of International Law*. 8v. (Washington, 1906), VII, 562.

virtually asserted that there can be no blockade by mere declaration, was greatly influenced by principle and practice of the War of 1812. During the American Civil War, the Federal Government actually made its blockade of the Southern ports effective.

From the time of Benjamin Franklin, American diplomacy was characterized by entire frankness and straightforwardness. This constituted a step forward in doing away with secret diplomacy. Early American diplomacy was epitomized in the instructions given to John Jay when he was sent abroad on an important mission by President Washington. The Secretary of State wrote:

It is the President's wish that the characteristics of an American Minister should be marked on the one hand by a firmness against improper compliances, and on the other hand by sincerity, candor and prudence, and by a horror of finesse and chicanery.¹⁵

Numerous examples could be given to show that frankness and directness have been conspicuous in the subsequent diplomatic history of the United States. For instance, J. B. Moore says:

As it was in the beginning, so American diplomacy has in the main continued to be, a simple, direct and open diplomacy, the example of which has had much to do with shaping the development of modern methods.¹⁶

Similarly, Steward L. Woodford in discussing the conduct of foreign affairs of the United States says that "in conformity with the traditional diplomacy of the United States, when the American Minister reached Spain he was absolutely direct and frank in his dealings."¹⁷ In evaluating the services of John Adams, Judge Chamberlain was perhaps

¹⁵ John W. Foster, article entitled "American Diplomacy" in *Encyclopedia Americana*, I, 512.

¹⁶ John Bassett Moore, *American Diplomacy, Its Spirit and Achievements*, (N.Y., 1905), 255-256.

¹⁷ Grosvenor, *op. cit.*, 295.

justified in stating that Adams' "path went straight to its object, and his movements in it were simple and direct."¹⁸

The United States has long advocated the Pacific Settlement of international controversies. The Jay Treaty of 1794 with the British Empire was the first American treaty of arbitration. The treaty with Spain in 1795 also contained provisions for arbitration and conciliation. During the two generations which followed the War of 1812, nearly all disputes, with very few exceptions, were settled by peaceful means. In that period, the United States established many commissions and tribunals of arbitration. After the Civil War, the United States submitted the Alabama claims with Great Britain to an arbitration tribunal which met at Geneva in 1871. It was quite proper, therefore, for President McKinley to state, in his Inaugural Address on March 4, 1897, that arbitration has been recognized as the leading feature of our foreign policy throughout our entire national history—the adjustment of difficulties by judicial methods rather than force of arms—and since it presents to the world the glorious example of reason and peace, . . . an example certain to be followed by others . . .¹⁹

A spirit of equity and fair dealing has generally marked the conduct of American foreign policy. The Claims Commissions with Venezuela, Haiti and Mexico might be cited as illustrations. Though the Washington Government has been occasionally misled by some unwise statesmen and diplomats, it has not hesitated, when fully possessed of the iron logic of facts, to rectify any injuries inflicted upon friendly nations by means of international commissions or courts. The Alaska Boundary Tribunal of 1903 furnished us an example of judicial settlement of disputes among nations by reference to a special court agreed upon "ad hoc."

In 1908-11, Mr. Root, Secretary of State, made nearly twenty

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 295-296.

¹⁹ James D. Richardson (ed.), *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents*. 20v. (N.Y., 1897-1927), XIII, 6242.

treaties which refer to the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration problems of a legal nature or relating to the interpretation of treaties, provided they do not effect vital interests and independence or national honor. In 1911, President Taft framed treaties with both Great Britain and France concerning arbitration of all questions in dispute justiciable in their nature, to which was coupled a Commission of Inquiry provision. Though these treaties unfortunately did not gain the consent of the Senate of the United States and were not ratified, yet the idea of arbitration and of Commissions of Inquiry has been favored by many American authorities on international affairs. In 1913-14, Mr. Bryan, Secretary of State, drew up more than thirty treaties based on a peace plan which referred all matters in dispute to Commissions of Inquiry, and additions to this group of treaties were made by Secretary Kellogg. The Washington Government approved the selection of an American member of the Commission of Inquiry of the League of Nations in the Sino-Japanese Dispute.

The international policy of the United States concerning arbitration and conciliation is summarized in an abstract of the provision of law declaring the international policy of the United States enacted by the 64th Congress on August 29, 1916:

It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to adjust and settle international disputes through mediation or arbitration, to the end that war may be honorably avoided. It looks with apprehension and disfavor upon a general increase of armament throughout the world, but it realizes that no single nation can disarm, and that without a common agreement upon the subject every considerable power must maintain a relative standing in military strength

In view of the premises, the President is authorized and requested to invite at an appropriate time, not later than the close of the war in Europe all the great Governments of the world to send representatives to a conference which shall be charged with the duty of formulating a plan for a court of arbitration or other tribunal to which disputed questions between nations shall be referred for

adjudication and peaceful settlement and to consider the question of disarmament and submit their recommendations to their respective Governments for approval.²⁰

Therefore, it was in keeping with this record for Secretary Hull, in his address at the Buenos Aires Conference on December 5, 1936, to definitely declare the diplomacy of his Government is that—

We reject war as a method of settling international disputes and favor such methods as conference, conciliation and arbitration.²¹

"USE OF FORCE"

In spite of a genuine passion for and advocacy of the pacific settlement of international disputes by American statesmen and diplomats and the echoes of the American people against war, it can not be said that the United States has a perfect record as a "pacific nation." Of course, it is true that her record on the whole is perhaps less aggressive than other nations, European or Asiatic, and that in recent years she has become so self-sufficient as to be in a better position to afford to advocate the pacific settlement of international differences and to declare against war as an instrument of national policy.²² But the fact remains that she has fought twice with Great Britain,²³ once with Mexico,²⁴ once with Spain²⁵ and as an Associated Power in the World War.²⁶ In addition, in the name of self-defense or self-preservation or of protection of her nationals, the United States has used an armed force against foreign

²⁰ Department of State, *Statutes at Large of the United States*. XXXIX (64th Congress), 618-9.

²¹ U. S. Department of State, *Press Releases*, Vol. 15 (December 5, 1936), 435.

²² J. T. Shotwell, *War as an Instrument of National Policy*. (N.Y., 1929) and *The Pact of Paris*. (N.Y., 1928).

²³ Samuel F. Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States* (N.Y., 1936), 46-64; 159-176.

²⁴ John H. Latane, *A History of American Diplomacy*. (N.Y., 1927), 260-283.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 498-516; cf. also 432-450.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 579-596.

governments in the following instances: Amelia Island (1812), Spanish Florida (1817), Cuba (1823-1906), Porto Rico (1824), Falkland (1831), Sumatra (1832), Fiji Islands (1840 and 1858), Samoa (1840-41 and 1888), Island of Johanna (1851), Japan (1853, 1854, 1863, 1864 and 1868), China (1854, 1856, 1859 and 1900), Egypt (1858 and 1882) Uruguay (1855 and 1868), Kisembo, Africa (1860), Formosa (1867), Korea (1871, 1888 and 1894), Omoa, Honduras (1873), Honolulu (1874), Mexico (1876), Haiti, (1888), Navassa Island (1891), Chile (1891), Hawaii (1893), Brazil (1893), Nicaragua (1895, 1899 and 1910), Samoa (1899), Dominican Republic (1903 and 1904), Honduras (1907 and 1910-11).²⁷

ECONOMIC POLICY

In spite of this record for the pacific settlement of international controversies, marred as it has been at times, by the employment of armed force against foreign governments, economic interest has been the pivot of American diplomacy ever since the United States entered the family of nations. It was George Washington who in his farewell address, charted the direction which this economic interest should take. "The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations", he said, "is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible."²⁸

"By 1807 American exports had risen to more than \$100,000,000, five times their value in 1790."²⁹ "Industrial production had jumped from seven billion in 1899 to 37 billion in 1923,"³⁰ Before the War

²⁷ This list is based on U. S. Department of State, *Right to Protect Citizens in Foreign Countries by Landing Forces*. 3rd rev. ed., (Washington, 1934), originally a memorandum of the Solicitor for the Department of State written in 1912 and revised in 1933. Cf. Dana G. Munro, *The United States and the Caribbean Area*. (Boston, 1934)

²⁸ James D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*. 20v. (N.Y., 1897), I, 214.

²⁹ Rullis A. Goslin and William T. Stone, *America Contradicts Herself, The Story of Our Foreign Policy*, a pamphlet of the Foreign Policy Association (N.Y., 1936), 7.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 26.

the United States owed Europe some three billion dollars. She had borrowed money to build railroads and factories and ships, and to develop oil wells and mines. By 1921, because the United States had loaned money for the purchase of war supplies from this country, Europe owed the United States over twelve billion dollars. She had become not only the greatest trading and industrial nation in the world, but the chief creditor.³¹ In 1914, American investments in foreign lands were two and one-half billion, while in 1932 they became eighteen billion dollars.³²

At the end of the World War, she became an industrially matured state with huge, well-managed and most up-to-date machines, fit for mass production. Abundant raw materials for her industry are within the domains of the state. Since the World War she has become, if not the richest, at least one of the richest nations in industry and agriculture in our time. According to Curtis D. Wilbur, a former Secretary of the Navy of the United States, in 1935 there was a total amount of thirty-eight billion dollars outside the United States, owned or invested by the United States or its citizens, including the merchant marines, foreign trade, war debts, loans and property.³³ Since the World War one of the most important problems of the United States has been the question of the disposition of her surplus agricultural, commercial and industrial products and capital. The world depression contributed an important factor to the development of the Roosevelt-Hull reciprocal trade policy. The United States may be more self-sufficient than any other country in the world today, but this by no means proves that she is entirely self-sufficient. Intelligent statesmen like President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull have repeatedly said that nations are interdependent and interrelated. When President Roosevelt addressed the Buenos Aires Conference, December 1, 1936, he declared:

³¹ *Ibid.*, 27.

³² *Ibid.*, 29.

³³ *New York Times*, May 8, 1935.

I repeat what I said in speaking before the Congress and Supreme Court of Brazil. 'Each one of us has learned the glories of independence. Let each one of us learn the glories of interdependence.'³⁴

Secretary Hull announced on December 5, 1936, while speaking at the same conference:

While carefully avoiding any political entanglements, my Government strives at all times to cooperate with other nations to every practical extent to support of peace objectives, including reduction or limitation of armaments, the control of traffic in arms, taking the profits out of war, and the restoration of fair and friendly economic relations.³⁵

Assistant Secretary of State Sayre, who has immediate supervision of the reciprocal trade agreement program, admits that "economic nationalism may be a pretty theory, but its actual cost is shocking almost beyond belief".³⁶ and "economic nationalism offers no promise of lasting peace".³⁷ He also openly maintains that "the most extreme economic nationalists would admit that any sweeping program of complete economic self-sufficiency, even of the United States is impossible in the world of fact".³⁸

However, some isolationists in the United States may claim that the United States is entirely self-sufficient, that she needs not to put her finger in either European or Asiatic problems of world significance. But the fact remains that, although the United States is perhaps more self-sufficient than any other country and is in the first rank as an industrial and commercial nation, she needs world markets in order to enable her to enjoy recovery and prosperity. An American authority of foreign trade, after a careful study of the dependency of the United States on

³⁴ *Press Releases*, Vol. 15 (December 5, 1936), 425.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 434-5.

³⁶ Francis B. Sayre, *The Cost of Economic Nationalism*. (Washington, 1935), 6.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 9.

³⁸ Sayre, *Trade Policies and Peace*. (Washington, 1936), 2-3.

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foreign countries with respect to raw materials and foodstuffs, makes the following table.³⁹

I. Practical total dependency of the United States on foreign countries.

A. Reproducible raw materials

- | | |
|--------------------|------------|
| 1. Shellac | 6. Sisal |
| 2. Quinine | 7. Manila |
| 3. Natural camphor | 8. Silk |
| 4. Copra | 9. Flax |
| 5. Jute | 10. Rubber |

B. Non-reproducible raw materials

- | | |
|--------------|-------------------|
| 1. Quebracho | 6. Platinum |
| 2. Potash | 6. Sodium nitrate |
| 3. Asbestos | 8. Nickel ore |
| 4. Cryolite | 9. Antimony ore |
| 5. Tin ore | 10. Monazite |

II. Not produced in sufficient quantity and imports necessary to supply domestic needs.

A. Reproducible

- | | |
|------------|--|
| 1. Tobacco | 4. Citrate of lime |
| 2. Hemp | 5. Hides and skins |
| 3. Wool | 6. Certain vegetable oils (cocoanut, olive, linseed and peanut oils) |

B. Non-reproducible

- | | | |
|--------------|--------------|----------------------|
| 1. Arsenic | 5. Magnesite | 9. Vanadium |
| 2. Manganese | 6. Abrasives | 10. Fluorspar |
| 3. Chromite | 7. Barytes | 11. Quicksilver |
| 4. Tungsten | 8. Mica | 12. Natural graphite |

The above table does not include some foodstuffs which the United States either does not produce or produces with insufficient quantity or inferior quality, such as tea, coffee, chocolate, bananas, *et cetera*.

Moreover, the dependency of the United States on foreign trade may be shown by the following table:⁴⁰

³⁹ W. S. Culbertson, "Raw Materials and Foodstuffs in the Commercial Policies of Nations", in *Annals*, Vol. 52 (1924) 21-26.

⁴⁰ Charles A. Beard, *The Ideal of National Interest*. (N.Y., 1934), 284-285. This is abridged from Beard's work which is compiled from U. S. Department of Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1932, from the Commerce Yearbook, and from current data, etc.

UNITED STATES EXPORTS					UNITED STATES IMPORTS			
REGION	1910.	1921.	1929	1932	1901.	1921.	1929	1932
	1914	1925			1914	1925		
North America:								
Amount, millions of dollars.....	503	1,701	1,071	1,395	347	910	981	338
Percent of total	23.2	24.4	26.6	22.6	22.6	26.4	22.3	25.5
South America:								
Amount, millions of dollars.....	121	297	539	97	206	421	639	200
Percent of total	5.6	6.8	10.3	6.0	12.2	12.2	14.5	15.1
Europe:								
Amount, millions of dollars.....	1,350	2,317	2,340	785	836	1,049	1,332	389
Percent of total	62.3	52.7	44.7	48.6	49.5	30.4	30.3	29.4
Asia:								
Amount, millions of dollars.....	121	499	643	292	258	943	1,280	362
Percent of total	5.6	11.3	12.3	18.1	15.3	27.3	29.1	27.3
Oceania:								
Amount, millions of dollars.....	47	141	192	37	17	54	57	8
Percent of total	2.2	3.2	3.6	2.2	1.0	1.6	1.3	.5
Africa:								
Amount, millions of dollars.....	25	70	130	36	23	71	109	24
Percent of total	1.1	1.6	2.5	2.2	1.3	2.1	2.5	1.8

The following table ⁴¹ perhaps suffices to show the importance of export trade to the economic life of the American nation and its people:

⁴¹ Beard, *op. cit.*, 257. Abridged table from Beard.

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LEADING COMMODITIES IN THE UNITED STATES EXPORTS

(Value in millions of dollars)

Commodity	Value				Percent of total exports			
	1922. 1926	1929	1930	1931	1910. 1914	1922. 1926	1930	1931
Average								
Cotton, unmanu- factured.....	861.0	770.8	496.7	325.9	25.9	19.7	13.1	13.7
Machinery-Indus- trial, agricul- tural and elec- trical.....	318.6	608.9	517.2	318.3	7.4	7.3	13.8	13.4
Petroleum and products.....	436.0	561.2	494.2	260.5	6.0	10.0	13.1	11.4
Automobiles, parts, accessories.....	224.5	539.3	277.4	146.7	1.1	5.1	7.3	6.2
Tobacco, unmanu- factured.....	151.0	146.1	145.6	110.8	2.1	3.4	3.9	4.7
Fruits and nuts.	91.2	137.5	110.9	109.3	1.3	2.1	2.9	4.6
Chemicals and related products	112.8	152.1	128.0	100.1	2.2	2.6	3.4	4.2
Packinghouse products.....	274.2	202.8	152.5	96.2	7.1	6.3	4.1	4.0
Wheat, including flour.....	268.7	192.3	157.5	84.2	5.0	6.1	4.2	3.5
Iron and steel products.....	154.4	200.1	138.9	63.2	4.3	3.5	3.7	2.7
Coal and coke....	137.7	106.2	89.8	64.5	2.6	3.1	2.4	2.7
Cotton manufac- tures, including yarns.....	135.7	135.1	88.7	60.1	2.1	3.1	2.3	2.5
Copper, including ore and manufac- tures.....	138.4	183.4	105.3	54.7	5.7	3.2	2.8	2.3
Sawmill products.	94.1	110.6	78.4	45.1	3.1	2.1	2.1	1.9
Iron and steel advanced manufac- tures.....	66.7	89.6	65.5	37.1	2.1	1.5	1.7	1.6
Rubber and manu- factures.....	45.0	77.0	58.9	36.7	.6	1.0	1.6	1.5
Leather.....	47.9	42.9	35.5	25.6	1.8	1.1	.9	1.1
Paper and manu- factures	32.8	40.9	29.4	22.5	.5	.8	.9	.9
Wood manufactures, advanced.....	23.9	37.1	30.3	19.2	1.2	.7	.8	.8
Photographic and projection goods.	17.9	31.6	29.5	20.1	.4	.4	.8	.8

President Taft formulated the policy that "an increasing expansion of foreign trade is possible and indispensable to the prosperity of American

business.”⁴² President Wilson apparently tried to secure a democratic and peaceful world with a view that commercial intercourse would automatically follow.⁴³

President Hoover maintained that foreign trade was essential to the United States.⁴⁴ The Department of Commerce, under Hoover, became a significant factor of American diplomacy in protecting and promoting American economic interests abroad.

President Roosevelt, in his successful campaign for the presidency, advocated a reciprocal trade program with the hope that American recovery and prosperity might be aided thereby.⁴⁵ Foreign trade is so vital to the United States that it is not surprising that Secretary Hull declared: “We should set as our immediate objective the expansion of foreign trade to at least the volume of foreign trade which we had in the predepression period.”⁴⁶ It seems to be beyond doubt that, as long as Roosevelt and Hull remain in their official capacities, such an aim will continue to be part of their foreign policy. As late as January, 1937, President Roosevelt, in his letter to Representative Doughton, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, urging extension of his authority to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements, said:

In the present unfortunate state of world affairs, we dare not, in justice to ourselves, relax our effort or abate the vigor of our leadership, in a world-wide movement for durable peace through economic prosperity.⁴⁷

(To be continued)

潘朝英 Stephen C. Y. Pan

Providence College,
U. S. A.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 130.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 125.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 130-31.

⁴⁵ *The New York Times*, August 31, 1932.

⁴⁶ *Restoration of International Trade* (Publication No. 741, Washington 1935), 6. This is a speech given by Secretary Hull in May, 1935.

⁴⁷ *The Washington Post*, January 22, 1937. The full text can be found there.

AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF PRINCIPLES OF
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY—WITH AN EMPHASIS ON
THEIR APPLICATION IN CHINA

(Concluded)

MOTIVATIONS OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

In regard to the motivation of American diplomacy, it is a fact that the protection of the interests of Americans at home and abroad has been a cardinal principle of American diplomacy from the administration of George Washington to that of Franklin D. Roosevelt. The conception of national interest in diplomacy is not peculiarly American. Under the present system of States, the fundamental reason for the existence of governmental machinery is the furtherance of national interests, whether internally or externally. It is axiomatic, therefore, that each State should have due regard for its national interests in the conduct of foreign relations.⁴⁸ States may have different methods of attaining this end on account of their difference in geographical positions, histories, psychologies, traditions, economics, political systems, and other factors. Policies of various States may be either in harmony or in conflict with those of others. Occasionally, when the policies of one State are in close harmony with those of another, there may arise the feeling that one or the other of these policies is altruistic since it is to the advantage of the second State. Actually, of course, altruism plays a negligible part in foreign policies. The so-called altruistic State is merely serving her own interests in a way that happens to be profitable to the second State. When this principle is applied to the United States, it is discovered that American national interest centers upon two fundamental

⁴⁸ Charles A. Beard, *The Idea of National Interest—An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1934), *passim*.

points—the promotion of trade interests and the protection of its territory. Having reached her goal, her so-called “Manifest Destiny”, the United States has acquired a high degree of economic self-sufficiency. Since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands, she has almost reached the point of maximum territorial expansion. She is now perhaps the most satisfied and the most stabilized nation in the world. Without many territorial ambitions for the time being, the primary concern of the United States in foreign relations is the promotion of trade interests. In regard to her geographical situation, the United States is continental in character. Alone on a great continent, separated by wide oceans on the east and west, by a friendly neighbor on the north, and by weak neighbors in the south, the vital concern of the United States is the protection of her borders, dependencies, and sea routes. Consequently, she needs a large navy for the protection of her first line of national defence. The Monroe Doctrine, which has become a traditional and physically unchallengeable American foreign policy, requires the United States to maintain a strong navy. President Andrew Jackson, on March 2, 1837, in explaining why he wanted to maintain a big Navy, wisely pointed out:

“No nation, however desirous of peace, can hope to escape occasional collisions with other powers, and the soundest dictates of policy require that we should place ourselves in a position to assert our rights if a resort to force should ever become necessary. Our local situation, our long line of sea coast, indented by numerous bays, with deep rivers opening into the interior, as well as our extensive and still increasing commerce, point to the Navy as our national means of defense.”⁴⁹

NAVAL POLICY AND DEFENCE

From President Washington to President Harding, all the American Presidents considered it absolutely necessary “to maintain the navy

⁴⁹ Navy Department, *American Naval Policy as Outlined in Messages of the Presidents of the United States, from 1790 to 1924* (Washington, 1924), 7. This work was originally edited by Theodore Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, in 1897. The extracts from 1894 to 1924 were added by the Navy Department. In the Preface of this book, it is stated that “It expresses in concrete form the policy which the Navy Department is following.”

sufficient to support the national policies and commerce, and to guard the continental and overseas possessions of the United States.”⁵⁰ The Trammell-Vinson Act of March 27, 1934, authorized the American Government to build its navy up to the limit prescribed by the Washington and London Naval Treaties of 1922 and 1930 respectively.⁵¹ President Roosevelt’s billion dollar program for National defence in 1936-1937 was the largest peacetime defence bill in American history. Moreover, estimates of naval appropriations for the fiscal year 1938 amount to \$563,996,359. which, compared with the aggregate amount of \$529,819,632 appropriated for the fiscal year 1937, indicates a net increase of \$34,176,727.⁵²

The United States, however, can not afford to jeopardize her national security by placing too much reliance upon her favorable geographical position and her naval strength. American statesmen and military and naval authorities are fully aware of the following facts:⁵³

(1) The ocean greyhound, the cable, the radio, the airplane and other communication devices have brought every civilized country into a closer relationship with other nations; whether one likes it or not, the United States of America no longer exists, either physically or politically, as an isolated nation. Ocean distances are no longer safeguards against foreign aggressions.

(2) As long as some Powers do not fully live up to treaties and international law and are not disposed to settle international problems

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, A Table of “U. S. Naval Policy” annexed therein.

⁵¹ This act is H. R. 6604 or Public No. 135 in the *Statutes at Large of the United States*, vol. 48, Art. I (Washington, 1934), 503.

⁵² *The Washington Post*, May 31, 1936.

⁵³ Public Relations Branch of the War Department, (compiled) *Our Military System* (Washington, 1930); Rear Admiral John W. Greenslade, *Nations and Naval Policy in Relation to Security and National Welfare*, an address given on October 27, 1937, in Detroit. This is issued by the Navy Department in the form of a mimeograph; Navy Department, *The United States Navy in Peace Time: The Navy in its Relation to the Industrial, Scientific, Economic, and Political Development of the Nation* (Washington, 1931). Navy Department, *Sea Power—What is It?* Navy Department, *Merchant Marine and Bases; a Collection of Articles* (Washington, 1936).

amicably, armed conflict may occur at any time. If such armed conflict develops into war, declared or undeclared, whether it be in Europe or in Asia, the United States may eventually be involved in it.

(3) In the light of the present world situation, adequate defense is a good guaranty of peace and it is very probably able to save the United States from international embroilment and from damage to American foreign interests.

(4) Peace without adequate defense and security is an illusion impossible of attainment. The American Government is engaged in defense preparations designed to give this nation a practical security commensurate with its needs as dictated by the activities and developments among the nations of the world.⁵⁴

With these facts in mind, Harry H. Woodring, then Assistant Secretary of War, revealed on January 16, 1935, "the purchase of a fleet of five hundred high-speed, combat-type airplanes to bolster the flying wings of the General Headquarters Air Force."⁵⁵ Major General Oscar Wester, Chief of the Army Air Corps was reported on January 4, 1937, to have told the National Aeronautic Association that, despite the comparatively poor condition of the Army Air Corps equipment, considerable strides had been made in the procurement policy during the past two years. The fact remains that five hundred and six new planes were delivered to the War Department, while the Navy Department, keeping pace in 1936 with its one-thousand-planes program, had an excess of one thousand two hundred and twenty planes at the end of June, 1936, of which two hundred and forty were considered out-dated, but serviceable.⁵⁶ The adoption of the policy "more adequate and more

⁵⁴ War Department, *Mimeograph of an Address by Harry H. Woodring under the Auspices of the National Radio Forum*, issued on November 30, 1936. Cf. *Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1936*, (Washington, 1936). 1.

⁵⁵ *The Washington Post*, Jan. 17, 1935.

⁵⁶ *The New York Times*, Jan. 5, 1937.

up-to-date defensive program" is primarily due to the belief of American military and naval experts that the United States should not allow herself to repeat her bitter experience of the World War, that is, to be caught in a state of unpreparedness.⁵⁷

ALLEGED "MORAL SUPERIORITY"

It has been pointed out that American economic interests and national security are the two pivots or determining factors in American diplomacy. However, another factor which should not be overlooked when one tries to analyze American policy is that, rightly or wrongly, the Americans are alleged to have a sense of moral superiority. In discussing this question, a certain writer is of the opinion that the American people have two beliefs: (1) that they are "blessed with an inherent moral superiority over the other citizens of the globe;" and (2) that the United States lays herself "open to being harmed, or tricked, or evilly entangled"⁵⁸ by coming into contact with foreign nations. The American people may forget what they have done to some Latin American countries, may disregard their wars with foreign States and their annexations of alien territory, but they still maintain that they have a high sense of international morality which is based on their sense of "right and justice."⁵⁹ In 1899 President McKinley, in attempting to justify the American acquisition of the Philippine Islands stated: ". . . they came to us as a gift from God,—there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and to uplift and civilize and christianize them. . . ."⁶⁰

In 1917, when the United States declared war against Germany, President Wilson referred to the United States as the champion of

⁵⁷ *The Washington Post*, Dec. 9, 1937.

⁵⁸ Paul Scott Mower, *Our Foreign Affairs—A Study in National Interest and the New Diplomacy* (New York, 1924), 20.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁶⁰ Charles S. Olcott, *Life of William McKinley* (2 vols; Boston, New York, 1916), II, 190-191.

mankind.⁶¹ In many other instances, phrases such as "humanity, justice and righteousness," "democracy is the best form of government," "in this Great Republic, the people enjoy liberty and to the greatest extent," can be found.

Another factor which has a very important bearing in United States diplomacy is that practically every international engagement (there are some exceptions, such as executive agreements, etc.) requires the approval of two-thirds of the Senate, a body whose members represent the sentiments of the people of the Union. Therefore, the President or his accredited agents are limited in their negotiating power. They can not utilize this power to fulfill their personal ambitions or fortunes nor can they conclude a treaty which is purely altruistic or too aggressive. They may have some high ideals and good political philosophy, but they can hardly set their ideals above the national interest and security of the State.

PUBLIC OPINION

Another factor that plays an important part in American diplomacy is "public opinion," which is, "an expression of dominant conviction backed by an intention to give effect to it."⁶² At times, public opinion "is a collective psychoses, but, instead of being aroused or influenced by emotional motives, it is a conscious one, built up freely and founded upon fact."⁶³ It is conceivable that "under the scientific aspect of the creation of a public opinion by propaganda,"⁶⁴ propaganda has gained ground in international affairs. It sometimes takes place in the form of slogans. For instance, during the World War, an outcry in the United States was "Make the World Safe for Democracy." Another example

⁶¹ Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd (ed.) *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (3 vols; New York, London, 1925-1927), III, 16; 22.

⁶² John W. Defoe, "Public Opinion as a Factor in the Government," in Quincy Wright (ed.) *Public Opinion and World Politics* (Chicago, 1933), 7.

⁶³ Jules A. Serwein, "The Molders of Public Opinion," in Wright, *op. cit.*, 90.

⁶⁴ Edgar Stern-Rubart, "The Methods of Political Propaganda," *ibid.*, 112

is "Be American and Buy American," as it has been so frequently advocated by certain newspapers. Since this country is a democratic country, public opinion has a free place in the international dealings of America, and it may offer tentative policies or even attack the governmental attitude toward world problems. The guarantee of free speech by the American Constitution makes the press free to attack foreign policies of the Government, with which it does not agree. Sometimes the press, regardless of the significance and the consequence of certain news, prints practically everything without realizing what effects it produces on international affairs. For example, the New York Times, one of the outstanding dailies in the United States, uses on its masthead the slogan "All the news that's fit to print." Whenever there is a problem of an international nature, newspapers and periodicals often express their opinion of it, no matter whether their view coincides or diverges from the view expressed by the American Government. In many cases, responsible American officials do not ignore their voice. Radios and motion pictures are so widely used in this country as instruments in interpreting the news of the world that their influence in the minds of the public is important. In turn their influence on the minds of responsible American officials should not be overlooked. Elihu Root rightly recognized that public opinion should occupy an important place in the determination of foreign policy or the conduct of foreign relations.

EXECUTION OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

Bearing these objectives and various factors in mind, we find that the execution of American diplomacy is indicated in the following general ways:

1. The United States recognizes that every nation has the right to exist and to protect and to conserve its existence. However, this right neither implies the right nor justifies the act of the State to protect itself or to conserve its existence by the commission of unlawful acts against innocent States.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ (Cf. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S.C.A. 581, 606, 607; Regina vs,

2. The United States, as it has been expressed by Secretary Hull, recognizes "the right of all nations to handle their affairs in any way they choose, and this quite irrespective of the fact that their way may be different from our way, or even repugnant to our ideas."⁶⁷ In other words, she advocates the principle that every nation has the right of independence in the sense that it has a right to the pursuit of happiness and that it is free to develop itself without interference or control from other states, provided that in so doing it does not interfere with or violate the rights of other states. The internal sovereignty of the United States was fixed by the Declaration of Independence as a "free, sovereign, and independent state."⁶⁸

3. The Government of the United States holds that every nation is in law and in the eyes of the law the equal of every nation belonging to the family of nations, and that all nations have the right to claim, and according to the Declaration of Independence "to assume, among the Powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them."⁶⁹

4. The United States recognizes the principle that every nation is entitled by the law of nations to have her rights respected and protected by all other nations, because right and duty are correlative, the right of one imposes a duty on the other.⁷⁰

5. The United States has advocated the policy of arbitration. President Coolidge expressed it in his Annual Message to Congress (1923):

"By example and by treaty we have advocated arbitration. For nearly twenty-five years we have been a member of the Hague Tribunal,

Dudley, 15 Cox's Criminal Case, Queen's Bench Division, 273, 624.634).

⁶⁷ The *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*, December 6, 1936.

⁶⁸ See U. S. Constitution. This principle was re-emphasized by Secretary Seward in 1879. Cf. *U. S. For. Rels.*, 1880, 194-195.

⁶⁹ Cf. *Antelope*, 10 Wheaton, 66, 122; *Louis Case*, 2 Dodson, 210, 243-245.

⁷⁰ Cf. *The United States vs. Arjona*, 120 U.S.C.A. 479-487.

and have long sought the creation of a permanent world court of justice. I favor the establishment of such a court intended to include the whole world.”⁷¹

6. Finally, as a “have” nation, world peace would serve the best interests of the United States. Thus, as an initiator of the Pact of Paris (1928), she renounced “war as an instrument of national policy,” and advocated that international controversies “only be sought by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process” and agreed “that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be . . . shall always be sought by pacific means.”

The principles and execution of American diplomacy in China are in no way separate or distinct from those which underlie American diplomacy in general. It is not entirely true, as some writer on American-Chinese relations has said, “the policy of the United States in China is characterized by unselfishness and friendliness.”⁷² The promotion of American interests in China has been constantly the main objective of American diplomacy there. From the first treaty between the United States and China, American policy has aimed to secure equal rights for American commerce in China, and in order to do so, she has had to oppose policies of Powers which might lead to the dismemberment of the Middle Kingdom.⁷³ The idea of equal opportunity of trade is embodied in this treaty, which later developed into the Open Door Doctrine. After the Spanish-American War, the United States became more interested in the Far East. As a commercial nation, from the time

⁷¹ Richardson, *op. cit.*, XVIII, 9341.

⁷² Mingchien Joshua Bau, *The Foreign Relations of China* (2 parts, Washington, 1921) Pt. II, 149. It might be true that the friendliness of American diplomacy toward it is very profitable to China. The interests of these two countries in many cases are parallel. But this does not mean that the United States purposely attempts to promote China's interests without consideration of the self-interests of the United States, for no sound diplomacy is based on “unselfishness.”

⁷³ Stephen C. Y. Pan, “The First Treaty between the United States and China,” in *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. 21, no. 2 (July, 1937) 155-190.

of John Hay, the United States has maintained a keen eye on her trade with China. In order to reach this objective, the American Government and people have been in favor of the Open Door Doctrine which aims at equal opportunity of trade there and the maintenance of the territorial and administrative entity of China. It can not be said, however, that this doctrine is entirely altruistic, for it serves well the best interests of the United States with a minimum of effort. As a matter of history, it happens that this American policy is not necessarily contradictory to the best interests of China; on the contrary, the interests of both countries may at times be identical as far as their foreign policy is concerned. Thus, governed by economic interests and political expediency, American diplomacy sought for the opening of China with a hope that the United States would not be discriminated against in trade, and would stand on equal footing with the other treaty Powers. In furtherance of this policy, the United States insists on the observance of treaty-rights and commercial interests and on the maintenance of China's territorial and administrative integrity. The truth of this statement is borne out by concrete acts. For instance, the formal announcement of the "Open Door" doctrine in 1899-1900;⁷⁴ the American protests against Japan's Twenty-one Demands on China;⁷⁵ the Knox Plan for the internationalization of the Manchurian railways;⁷⁶ and the oil controversy between Japan-Manchukuo on one side, and the United States and Great Britain and Netherlands on the other, are largely based on American interests in China. Of course, in regard to treaty-rights, duties and economic interests, the United States in many cases has shown her fairness and a sense of international justice. She has repeatedly sought to uphold China's integrity and sovereignty by various means, such as Hay's "open door" and Stimson's "non-recognition" doctrines. These were due to the fact that in order to promote American interests in China by peaceful

⁷⁴ "Affairs in China" in *U. S. Foreign Relations, 1907, Appendix* (Washington, 1902.)

⁷⁵ *U. S. Foreign Relations, 1915* (Washington, 1924), 146.

⁷⁶ *U. S. Foreign Relations, 1910* (Washington, 1915), 231-268.

means neither the "policy of isolation" nor the "Monroe Doctrine" could be properly applied to China. Perhaps nowhere can the objective of American diplomacy in China be better illustrated than in the words of former Secretary of State Hughes:

...it is the purpose of this Government neither to participate in nor to acquiesce in any arrangement which might purport to establish in favor of foreign interests any superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in designated regions of the territories of China, or, which might seek to create any such monopoly or preference as would exclude other nationals from undertaking any legitimate trade or industry or from participating with the Chinese Government in any category of public enterprise.⁷⁷

It is generally true that the total volume of American trade with Latin America or Europe is greater than that with China or even the entire Far East. However, the importance of Chinese trade with the United States is of no little significance. This has certainly been fully realized by those who have been in charge of American diplomacy in China, and their immediate objective of economic interests undoubtedly has played a great deal in making up this policy in China. As early as 1823-1827, American exports to Canton were 5.3 per cent of the total American exports, and American imports from that port were 7.3 per cent of all the American foreign trade. By 1848-52, however, the exports to China had dropped to 1.2 per cent and the imports to 3.0 per cent of the total exports and imports, while the total trade was only 4.3 per cent of the entire American foreign trade. After that up until 1914 American trade relations with China became relatively unimportant. The World War brought to the United States a marked expansion of trade and other economic interests in China.⁷⁸ As an outstanding observer of foreign affairs points out, if the value of foreign investments

⁷⁷ Charles E. Hughes, "Some Aspects of Our Foreign Policy," in *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1922 (2 vols. and suppl. Washington, 1926), I, 264. Secretary Hughes' quotation of his own note to the Chinese Minister at Washington on July 1, 1921.

⁷⁸ Grover Clark, "American Interests and Policy in the Far East," in *International Conciliation*, no. 307 (February, 1935) 48-51.

is to be judged by the amount of trade which is carried on with the countries where the investments are made, then

... the American investments in China have been very substantially more worthwhile than either the British or the Japanese. The American investments in that country have been since the World War, and now are, somewhat less than a tenth of the total American investments, while Britain's and Japan's in the past ten years or so have run close to a third of the total. Regularly since 1925, however, American trade with China has exceeded that of the British Empire, excluding the trans-shipping center of Hongkong. Since 1931, too, China has done more business with the United States than with Japan.⁷⁹

An analysis of China's import and export during 1935 discloses that the United States again ranked foremost on the import list by shipping \$174,930,000 worth of goods to China, equivalent to 18.93 per cent of China's total imports. Compared with the figure of 1934, it shows a decrease of 8 per cent. Second place was retained by Japan, Germany rose to the third, while Great Britain receded to fourth place in China's 1935 foreign trade. From 1932 to 1935, American exports to China increased annually both in volume and value.⁸⁰

Turning to the prospect of the future market of China for American trade, it is generally admitted that with the vast population of China and her need for industrial and mechanical equipment, the United States as well as other Western Powers will have an ample opportunity for developing their trade. American statesmen and diplomats are certainly fully aware of this prospect. The purchasing power of the Chinese is still comparatively low, and this has caused the total volume of trade between China and the United States to remain relatively small. There-

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 52.

⁸⁰ *The Chinese Year Book*, 1936-37. (Shanghai, 1936), 854,856. Japan sold \$144,315,000 worth of goods to China in 1935 or 15.55 per cent of the total purchases of China from abroad, increasing by 3 per cent the 1934 figure. Germany sold to China goods with a value of \$103,385,000, or 11.09 per cent of the total while British shipments to China valued at \$98,232,000, equivalent to 10.48 per cent, shows a decrease of 1.52 from the 1934 figure.

fore, any improvement in the economic status of the Chinese population is certain to have a great effect on American economic life.⁸¹ Likewise, it is generally recognized that the younger Chinese are intelligent, capable, and are eager to improve their country. The increasing activities of industrialization and reconstruction in China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek during these past few years are indeed impressive. The spirit of renaissance and unification in China is really surprising to the outside world. Thus all this opens an extraordinary opportunity for trade to the rest of the world.

With economic interests and equal opportunity of trade in view, the execution of American diplomacy is, from the viewpoint that the United States generally has not acquired concessions, or spheres of influence in that country. It is natural, then, that the United States generally does not wish to join a concert of Powers for military action against China. In regard to the treaty-rights the United States has obtained from China or from international conferences or from the exchange of notes between various Powers, she insists that the sanctity of international engagements be maintained. In so far as her treaty-obligations are concerned, the United States tries to fulfill them through peaceful diplomatic means. Thus on various occasions, the United States has made strong protests, has demanded indemnities from China, has made apologies, and has asked punishment of riots, of Government officials, and of "bandits." At times, the display of armed force or even the actual use of force has occurred in order to acquire her ends. In the actual exercise of her policies in China the American official attitude and public opinion generally dwindle and swing from one side to another.

⁸¹ An analogous situation occurred in regard to Japan's trade relations with the United States. Before 1850, Japan, as China is today, was primarily agricultural. American exports to Japan rose from less than \$3,000,000 in 1880 to \$228,000,000 in 1928. In 1880 about 1 per cent of American foreign trade was with Japan. This rose to 2.7 per cent in 1900 and to over 8 per cent in 1935. What has been true to the case of Japan may probably be true of China, if no foreign encroachments will be in the way of her industrialization program. See Benjamin H. Williams, *American Diplomacy: Policies and Practices* (New York, London, 1936), 124-125.

In comparison with the policies of other Powers, the methods of protecting American interests are considerably moderate. Seldom does she go to the extreme of employing force against China or her nationals. In general, she expects to insure legitimate American interests without infringement of China's sovereignty. In pursuing her objectives in China, the United States at times does not hesitate to consult or cooperate with another Power or Powers or with international conferences, or even with the League of Nations. She has cooperated with this last often over the opposition of certain Americans.

Having accomplished her "Manifest Destiny" and reached her continental borders, the United States desires peace. Since the Spanish-American War, this nation has become the concept of world peace. The American people, as well as most of the other peoples of the world, are interested in peace, although there are more peace organizations and "professional" peace workers in the United States than in other countries. The American Government and people hope for peace, not simply because they love peace from a purely altruistic or ethical standpoint, but because world peace would best serve the interests of the United States. Therefore, the United States has no desire of waging war against China or any other foreign Power. For the same reason, she does not wish to see any other Power or Powers wage war or direct unprovoked aggressions against China. It is natural for the United States to expect herself as well as other interested Powers to observe the treaty stipulations concerning China in order to avoid any impairment or abridgment of the treaty rights of this American Republic. It happens that the insistence of sanctity of treaties and the observance of international engagements has been temporarily advantageous to China.

The motives of American diplomacy may be based on self-interests, as have been pointed out, but since the execution of this policy is not disadvantageous to China, most of the Chinese people and many impartial writers consider that American diplomacy in China has been, in the long run, fair and rather just. For instance, during the Opium War between

China and Great Britain, the United States not only did not show any hostility to China, but pledged herself to consider opium as contraband.⁸² The American-Chinese Treaty of 1858 provided that the United States would offer good offices, if she were informed that China was being "unjustly and oppressively" treated by any other nation.⁸³ When the European allied forces marched to Peking, the Americans did not positively and enthusiastically assist the military operations of the English, French and other Allied forces. When the Chinese Court was threatened by the European concert in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the Washington Government insisted on the "open door" doctrine, which, as a motive of enforcing this doctrine was primarily based on the trade interests of the United States and other foreign Powers. The return of the Boxer Indemnity Fund to China is very profitable to the Chinese youth and is one of the friendliest gestures that has been to China.⁸⁴ The United States was the first country to sign the Treaty of Chinese Tariff Autonomy on July 24, 1928.⁸⁵ This, in turn, caused the other Powers to follow the course.⁸⁶

In regard to American foreign policy toward China since 1928, it

⁸² *The Chinese Repository*, vol. 10, no. 4 (Canton, April, 1842). This magazine contains many documents relating to China's foreign relations from 1832 to 1851. Many documents concerning the Opium War are printed there.

⁸³ William M. Malloy, (compiled) *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776-1909* (2 vols., Washington, 1910). I, 212. Article I of this treaty states: "There shall be, as there have always been, peace and friendship between the United States of America and the Ta Tsing Empire [China], and between their people, respectively. They should not insult or oppress each other for any trifling cause, so as to produce an estrangement between them; and if any other nation should act unjustly or oppressively, the United States will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement of the question, thus showing their friendly feelings.

⁸⁴ U. S. President, *Remission of a Portion of the Chinese Indemnity*, etc. (Washington, 1909).

⁸⁵ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China, 1919-1929* (Washington, 1929), 230-231. This treaty was signed by J. V. A. MacMurray and Tse Ven Soong. Ratifications were exchanged in Washington, February 20, 1929.

⁸⁶ Robert T. Pollard, *China's Foreign Relation, 1918-1931* (New York, 1933), 342-369.

can also be judged in the light of the prescribed principles, motivation and execution of the general trends of American diplomacy. Without going into the details of each and every incident, it suffices to state that American diplomacy aims to protect and promote the national interests of the United States and its nationals. In so doing, the American Government tries to fulfill the purposes of its policy, as far as possible, in accordance with international law, treaty rights and duties and diplomatic practice. In case of any difference or controversy between the United States and other Power or Powers in relation to American policy in China, the United States tends to settle it through diplomatic channels based on international law and treaty stipulations. The United States would not use force against China or any other Power whose policy is not in harmony with American policy in that region, unless American security is threatened or American interests are greatly injured.

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